Abstract-This letter investigates the fundamental differences between how California Independent System Operator (ISO) and Midcontinent ISO calculate performance accuracy scores in their performance-based regulation markets. Both ISOs tend to follow the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission order 755 to pay regulation resources-whether conventional generators or distributed and demand side resources-based on their actual performance. The advantages and disadvantages of each method are systematically explained. First, real-world ISO data are used to show that there may exist major differences between these two methods in scoring accuracy under similar regulation performance scenarios. Next, the root causes for the observed differences are studied mathematically. Finally, some suggestions are made to improve these scoring methods; should these or other ISOs seek to refine their scoring formulas.
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I. INTRODUCTION

F EDERAL Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 755
requires Independent System Operators to develop pay-forperformance protocols in regulation markets to compensate regulation resources based on their actual performance. Such a payment, a.k.a, mileage payment, must reflect the regulation resource's speed and accuracy in following the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) dispatch regulation signal [1] . The goal is to compensate fast-response resources, such as aggregated and autonomous demand side resources, including electric vehicles, or batteries, based on their actual values.
California ISO (CAISO) and Midcontinent ISO (MISO) have both adopted this new market mechanism. They both calculate the mileage payment as a product of three terms:
The actual mileage is the up/down actual movement of the resource to follow the AGC dispatch signal. The mileage price is determined by the market. The performance score is a coefficient that evaluates the performance of the resource in terms of following the AGC dispatch signal. The last item, i.e., the performance score, is the matter of our focus in this letter because it is a key factor in implementing FERC Order 755 to reward resources based on their performance [2] . CAISO and MISO use different formulations for their performance score. Each ISO has its own considerations for its choice. Our focus is not on questioning the metrics used by these two ISOs. Instead, we seek to understand how these two metrics result in different implications. Our study is motivated by some recent ISO reports that raise concerns about their own performance scoring methods. For example, as noted in [3, p. 12], CAISO is interested in refining its scoring method based on comparisons with other ISOs: "The CAISO reviewed different methods for accounting for accuracy used by other independent system operators and regional transmission operators in their Order 755 market designs. Alternative approaches adopted by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and PJM Interconnection may provide some guidance on how to refine the ISOs performance metric."
The contributions in this letter are as follows: 1) A systematic approach is taken to compare the performance scoring methods used by CAISO and MISO and to identify the advantages/disadvantages of each method. 2) By using real-world ISO data, it is shown that these two methods may result in significantly different scores for similar regulation performance scenarios. 3) Our study required doing a detailed mathematical analysis of the MISO performance accuracy score, which to the best of our knowledge, is done for the first time. 4) Some recommendations are made to refine and possibly improve these two performance scoring methods.
II. TWO PERFORMANCE SCORING METHODS
The performance score in CAISO is a number between 0 and 1, which we denote by PS CAISO . It is calculated once for each market interval that takes 15 minutes. The method of calculation is explained in [4] . Mathematically, we can write:
where at each time slot τ of length four seconds, s [τ ] and y[τ ] denote the AGC setpoint and the mechanical output of the regulation resource. The fraction in (2) is a normalized measure of performance inaccuracy in following the AGC setpoints. Thus, 1 minus the fraction is used to obtain a performance accuracy measure. Note that, [x] + = max{0, x}; and T = 15 × 60/4 = 225 denotes the number of time slots.
The performance score in MISO is also a number between 0 and 1. We denote it by PS MISO . It is calculated once for each market interval that takes five minutes. The AGC setpoints are sent once every four seconds. MISO first calculates the actual response, which is the accumulation of changes in the output of the resource 0885-8950 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. in response to the AGC setpoints, where a positive value indicates a move towards the AGC setpoint and a negative value indicates a move away from the AGC setpoint. The expected mileage is the desired movement towards the AGC setpoints starting at the mechanical output of the resource at the beginning of the market interval [5] . We can write:
where . Also note that, MISO does not distinguish the regulation mileage and energy mileage as far as the performance score is concerned [5] . However, since our focus here is on performance scoring methods of MISO and CAISO, we do not discuss this issue. In (2) and (3), the error, i.e., the distance from AGC signal, and the movements towards AGC setpoints at each four seconds interval are the measures for evaluating a good resource, respectively. Next, we follow the same philosophy in evaluating the performance scores used by each of the ISOs.
III. COMPARISON OF THE TWO METHODS
Consider the real-world ISO data in [6], comprising AGC setpoints and mechanical outputs of a regulation resource. Fig. 1 [τ ] . The regulation resource output y could be from a conventional generation or a distributed resources, such as aggregated and autonomous demand response units [7] . In Case 1, both resources make equal absolute errors. Thus, PS CAISO is the same for both resources. However, Resource 1 always moves in the direction of the AGC signal while Resource 2 moves in the opposite direction of the AGC signal. Hence, PS MISO rewards Resource 1 and penalizes Resource 2.
In Case 2, Resource 1 does not follow the AGC signal, except until the last time slot. Resource 2 does follow the AGC signal, except in the last time slot. While PS CAISO is higher for Resource 2, PS MISO is drastically lower for Resource 2. [τ ] . Assuming that the ramp rates are the same, the two resources perform similarly in following the AGC signal. They also create equal total regulation errors, at 8 MW. However, PS CAISO is very different for the two resources. PS CAISO is very sensitive to the magnitude of the AGC setpoints. PS MISO is reasonably similar for both resources. This is because the magnitude of the AGC setpoints forms a bias in the denominator in (2), even if the mileage values are exactly the same as for both resources.
IV. UNDERLYING CAUSES IN CASES 2 AND 3
The following Theorem is used to explain Cases 2 and 3. Theorem 1: The numerator in (3), i.e., the so-called actual movement, can be written in the following equivalent form:
where Φ is the set of all time slots τ = 1, . . . , T such that either
. Ψ is the set of all time slots such that either
. The set of all those time slots that do not belong to Φ and Ψ is defined by Ω.
Proof: After adding and subtracting s[τ − 1], we can rewrite the first term in the numerator in (3) as follows:
We can rewrite the second term in (3) as
where we used the fact that
. By subtracting (6) from (5), we can rewrite the numerator in (3) as (4) .
One can use the same methodology as in the above proof and go through similar but unnecessarily more complex equations, so as to expand Theorem 1 to the case with the presence of the ramp constraints. The conclusions will remain the same. Next, we explain the implications of the results in Theorem 1.
On one hand, the first term in (4) in Theorem 1 does not in any way depend on the generation output of the resources. It is, in fact, equal to the denominator in (3). On the other hand, given the negative signs of the other three terms, they all act as penalty factors in calculating the performance score. The first penalty term is impacted by the generation output of the resource only through set Ψ. The second penalty term is impacted by the generation output of the resource through not only set Φ but also the amount of the absolute regulation errors inside the summation. Note that, if τ ∈ Φ, then this penalty term is counted twice for time slot [τ − 1] . The last term is the absolute regulation error at the terminal time slot τ = T . We can see that the penalty terms for any τ ≤ T may be double counted if it belongs to sets Ψ and Φ. They may also be simply ignored if they belong to set Ω for all τ < T .
In Case 2, we have Φ = {}, Ψ = {}, Ω = {1,2,3,4,5} for Resources 1, and 2. Thus, the performance of the resources at time slots 1-4 are not considered by MISO. Here, MISO ignores the better performance of Resource 2 at time slots 2-4. But it does consider the better performance of Resource 1 at the time slot 5. Thus, MISO drastically favors Resource 1.
In Case 3, Φ = {5}, Ψ = {3,4}, Ω = {1,2} for both resources. The performance of the resources at time slots 1 and 2 are not considered by MISO. Further, MISO ignores the errors of the resources at time slots 3 and 4. Instead it penalizes them based on the penalty factor of mileage, i.e., the first penalty factor in (4). Finally, the error at time slot 4 is double counted; because Φ = {5}. Thus, the better performance of Resource 1 at time slots 2 and 3 is neglected and the better performance of Resource 2 at time slot 4 is counted twice.
V. RECOMMENDED MODEL REFINEMENTS
It appears that a "good resource" is defined by CAISO as one that shows low absolute errors in following AGC setpoints at individual time slots; and by MISO as one that moves towards the AGC setpoints across consecutive time slots. It is hard to argue which approach is better. Nevertheless, it is observed that some very small refinements may improve each metric. For example, we may refine the metric of CAISO as:
where we simply replace s [τ ] inside the summation in the denominator in (2) 
In such case, the ideal movement is recalculated at each four seconds interval. As a result, the ideal movement is no longer totally independent of the resource movement at each four seconds. PS MISO now changes from 1 to 0.25 in Case 2.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The different approaches taken by CAISO and MISO to set forth their performance scores is a fact stemming from CAISO and MISO being different markets, with different levels of demand for regulation, etc. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the different implications of these two different practical approaches and the root causes for such implications. This open problem was addressed in this letter. We showed that at least some of the issues that exist in practice, as raised by ISOs, come directly and provably from the core formulations of the performance metrics used by the ISOs. Thus, some refinements are recommended on each metric. Of course, it is ultimately up to the ISOs to decide whether to keep or refine their existing methods or adopt a new method. The mathematical models developed in this letter for performance scoring methods can be used also for broader analysis of the CAISO and MISO markets; such as to study how different resources may strategically respond to these scoring methods; as well as the impact on the overall market effectiveness under various physical and virtual bidding scenarios.
